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Philosophical Perspectives on
Fictional Characters
Paisley Livingston and Andrea Sauchelli

I

n what Fred Crews calls “duty free interdisciplinarity,” scholars
borrow an idea from another field and slip it across the border
into their home discipline, where it is misrepresented as the state
of the art in the source field.1 We aim to avoid this kind of error in the
following selective survey of philosophical perspectives on fiction and
fictional characters. Although we cannot offer a comprehensive historical
overview, we describe a number of different positions that have been
central to contemporary philosophical debates. We pass over various
approaches and topics that have figured prominently in literary theory,
and instead emphasize work that is less likely to be familiar to literary
scholars. Our focus here is on what can be called the more fundamental
issues, that is, questions about the very nature of fictional characters
and the basis of our knowledge of them. We take it that these issues
are logically distinct from, but of direct relevance to, a number of other
fascinating topics, including questions about the feelings or emotions
that are and are not appropriate to a reader’s experience of persons
represented in a work of fiction, or the question of whether and how
genuine knowledge is to be had from the experience of characters and
their doings in fictions.
We do not pretend to be neutral about the positions surveyed in what
follows, and shall refrain from misrepresenting our opinions as the object
of a philosophical consensus. It is our hope that literary scholars may
find some of these ideas insightful and useful, and indeed, we aim to
establish that the philosophers whose works we discuss have presented
a number of arguments and positions that are directly relevant to debates in literary studies. We hasten to add, however, that this is not a
situation where an authoritative theory can be imported from one field
into another. Instead, it should be acknowledged that topics surrounding fictional characters have proved to be an important challenge to
a number of sophisticated theories in metaphysics and the philosophy
of language and mind.
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Here is a brief outline of the paper. We begin by setting forth a basic
and central question about fictional characters and survey some of the
main ways of trying to answer this question. We start with the broad
family of realist approaches and discuss some of its members. The
premise shared by such approaches is that, at least in some cases, claims
about fictional characters refer to something real and can be right or
wrong. Having discussed realist approaches we then turn to “irrealist”
approaches. The basic orientation of all such approaches is provided
by the thought that fictional characters are in some sense a figment of
the human imagination. This family of views has its attractions, but faces
problems as well. Those who think the problems outweigh the advantages
have sought to find a way out of the realist/irrealist dilemma, and one
family of views, based on work by Alexius Meinong, is discussed. We
turn, finally, to issues related to the distinction between characters and
other aspects of the content of fictions, including the relation between
a literary concept of character and positions on personality theory in
psychology. In a brief conclusion we sketch our preferred stance on the
issues and positions canvassed in the paper.

A Challenge to Philosophy
Consider the following passage, which can be located in chapter 49
of any good edition of William Makepeace Thackeray’s Vanity Fair: A
Novel Without a Hero:
“I will do anything that may give pleasure to my Lord Steyne or to you,” said
Rebecca, sincerely grateful, and seating herself at the piano, began to sing.
She sang religious songs of Mozart, which had been early favourites of Lady
Steyne, and with such sweetness and tenderness that the lady lingering round the
piano, sate down by its side, and listened until the tears rolled down her eyes.2

With regard to this passage, it seems right to say that it is true in the
fiction that Lady Steyne is moved by Rebecca’s talented performance
of some of the Lady’s favorite songs by Mozart. Yet what makes this the
case? The philosophical challenge is to provide a principled account
that can adequately explain, not only cases like this simple paraphrase,
but the surprising variety of utterances about fiction, which includes
detailed interpretations of a work’s content, comparisons between different fictions (for example, “Rebecca Sharp is more evil than Barry
Lyndon”), existential statements (“There is no real Rebecca Sharp”),
critical or metafictional claims (“Rebecca Sharp is a character in Vanity
Fair”), and generalizations about the nature of fictional characters (“All
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fictional characters are abstract objects”). As we show in more detail in
what follows, these sample statements represent the striking variety of
the discourse about fictional characters, and it turns out that an account
or theory that can seem perfectly suited to dealing with one of these
types of statements may not work well at all in an attempt to explicate
some of the other kinds.
This most basic philosophical challenge concerning fictional characters can be couched as a question regarding the truth conditions of
the various kinds of statements about fictions. In other words, what, if
anything, could make a given statement about a fictional character right
or wrong? A brief clarification of how that question may be articulated
more fully is in order. Truth, we take it, is best characterized as relational.
One way to put this is to say, using David Armstrong’s influential idiom,
that truth requires not only a truth-bearer, or something that has the
property of being true, but also a truth-maker.3 What motivates this approach to the question of truth is the insight that the word “truth” does
not in general refer to some kind of simple and independent entity or
substance (as in Truth with a capital “t”). Instead, it is more plausible
to think of truth as a feature that something like a belief or a statement
can have or fail to have. Plausible truth-bearers, then, include statements,
beliefs, propositions, and thoughts. Yet in the case of empirical beliefs
or statements, a truth-bearer is true or false, not independently, but only
in relation to what it is about. For example, the bare fact that someone
believes himself healthy does not make this belief true or false. The
belief is about a physical condition that either does or does not obtain.
Or if someone asserts that Rebecca Sharp in Vanity Fair is a Martian
in disguise, the fact that such an assertion has been made does not in
itself make it correct. Truth, then, is understood as a relation between
a truth-bearer and a truth-maker (or more traditionally, as a correlation
between a proposition and a fact).
With these assumptions in mind, consider the statement, “Mozart
wrote some religious songs.” Here the truth-maker could be the event
of Mozart’s writing songs such as “O Gottes Lamm,” since it is the actual
occurrence of such an event that makes the statement true. Yet what is
the truth-maker in the case of the above-cited sentence to the effect that
Lady Steyne was moved by Rebecca Sharp’s performance of songs by
Mozart? If neither Rebecca Sharp nor Lady Steyne ever existed, it would
seem that there are no truth-makers for this sentence. Is it not simply
false, then, to say that Rebecca Sharp’s performance moved Lady Steyne
to tears? Yet such a conclusion is hardly appealing, at least for those of
us who are strongly inclined to think that some statements about what
happens in the fiction are true, while others are not.4 What, if anything,
makes them true or false?
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The problem is framed even more sharply for the many contemporary
philosophers who have espoused a general, “referentialist” theory of the
meaning of names, according to which the semantic contribution of a
name is nothing other than its referent (for example, the name “Mozart”
refers to Mozart, and its contribution to the meaning of the sentence
“Mozart wrote religious songs” is just Mozart, the real person).5 It could
seem to follow from this account that sentences containing fictional or
“empty” names are not meaningful (and false), but devoid of meaning.
Yet such an unsettling conclusion is hard to square with the fact that
people use such sentences in meaningful conversations about the works
of fiction they have experienced, and would appear to be able to agree
and disagree over the fictional characterizations in them (for example,
as when they readily concur that Mira Nair’s character named “Rebecca
Sharp” is quite different from the character in Thackeray who bears the
lexically identical name).
The philosophical challenge, then, is to say how statements about
fiction can be meaningful and, in some cases, true. This is of course
not the only important philosophical question that arises with regard to
fictional characters, but it is the central one in much of the contemporary
philosophical literature on the topic, and as was announced above, in
what follows our primary concern will be to survey some of the main
responses to this challenge.

Fictional Characters as Abstract Objects or Artifacts
Realists about fictional characters hold that fictional characters actually exist in a mind-independent manner and have determinate properties that can make certain statements about them true or false. So
the truth-makers for statements and beliefs about fictional characters
would be actual beings of some sort. Yet this line of thought is not very
promising if it is interpreted as the idea that every work of fiction is a
fiction à clef referring to specific, real-world persons. There is no good
reason to think that Thackeray had any one, actual person in mind in
writing about Rebecca Sharp, or that readers of his novel are supposed
to be thinking about and referring to that person. The statement, “Rebecca Sharp is just a fictional character and never really existed” seems
uncontroversially correct. How, then, could any realist approach be
squared with this fact?
One option, which has appealed to some literary theorists, is to hold
that fictional characters are the denizens of possible worlds, while also
holding that possible worlds exist.6 Very briefly, philosophizing about
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possible worlds finds its point of departure in the fact that we tend to
talk and think, not only about what (we think) is actually the case, but
also about what could or could not happen. For example, “If you do
not pass the exam, you will fail the course” expresses a train of thought
familiar to all teachers. So what are we talking about when we use counterfactual utterances and refer to nonactual states of affairs? “Possible
worlds” is one way of trying to reply to that question. Some philosophers,
including David K. Lewis, have argued for the concrete reality of all
possible worlds. What is merely possible from the standpoint of our
actual world could be, or perhaps even is, actual at some other world.
And if there are such possible worlds, maybe what a fiction describes is
a world of this sort, including its denizens. The tempting thought, then,
is that what makes some statements about fictions true is the possible
world this fiction is about. There are, however, some basic objections
to this entire approach, and we shall briefly evoke some of them in the
next paragraph.
It must be acknowledged, first of all, that as a given work of fiction
refers at best to a set of possible worlds, there is no simple one-to-one
mapping of fictional characters onto an individual person existing in
possible worlds.7 Why would that be so? A world is complete in the following sense: for any thought or proposition, it is either the case that
this proposition is true in that world or that it is false. A world is in this
respect determinate, which is not to say that anybody can know everything about it. In contrast to this basic assumption about worlds, the
domain or states of affairs evoked or represented by a work of fiction is
not complete in this sense. As Roman Ingarden famously argued, there
are “spots of indeterminacy” even for the most attentive reader who
keeps everything in the text vividly in mind.8 For example, there is the
world where Becky sang n songs by Mozart, the world where she sang
n+1 songs, the world where she wore n pieces of jewelry when she sang
Mozart songs, the world where she wore n+1 pieces of jewelry on that
occasion, and so on. It follows that if we think of fictions as referring to
possible worlds, Rebecca Sharp is not just one possible person inhabiting
one possible world, but a set of possible persons in an infinity of possible
worlds. Statements about the Thackeray character by that name would
be true, then, of all of the persons living in all of the possible worlds
where the name picks out someone corresponding to the type of person
represented by the descriptions of her in Thackeray’s work. For many
philosophers, this is enough to show that this entire approach does not
really provide an adequate elucidation of our ways of thinking about a
fictional character, since we are often inclined to think of a character
as one person or agent, and not a set of persons or agents. Sets, it may
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be helpful to recall, are not concrete entities, but abstract objects. The
property of being abstract, which is contrasted to the property of being
concrete, is usually understood as the property of not being spatiotemporally located, though there are other ways of drawing the distinction.9
At this point the most salient realist option is simply to accept this
consequence. Fictional characters are thereby accepted into one’s
ontology as a proper subset of the general category of abstract objects
or types.10 The realist may have independent grounds for holding that
abstract objects exist.11 Yet there is a major problem to be faced here.
Traditionally, abstract objects have been thought of as eternal and not
influenced by any interaction with concrete agents. According to this
Platonist understanding of abstract objects, they can be discovered but
not created by creatures located in space and time. However, this basic
premise about the status of abstract entities or abstracta runs contrary to
a deeply entrenched intuition about fictional characters, namely, that
they are created in a specific context by a specific author (or group of
collaborating authors). Although realism about abstract objects may
have the virtue of justifying certain kinds of statements about fictional
characters, it can be hard to accept the implication that Rebecca Sharp
exists eternally and would have done so had the human species never
evolved on the planet Earth.12
Is there no other option for some kind of realist approach to fictional
characters? Amie Thomasson is a contemporary philosopher who has
argued that the traditional philosophical manner of sorting entities as
abstract or concrete is not particularly enlightening. She proposes a different system of categories, and thus a different metaphysical picture,
based in part on the idea of ontological dependence, where, roughly
speaking, one item is ontologically dependent on another item just in
case the nonexistence of the former implies the nonexistence of the
latter.13 According to Thomasson, fictional characters such as Rebecca
Sharp and Gregor Samsa should be classified as humanly created abstract
artifacts.14 They are thereby recognized as sharing a common feature
with other entities that are familiar parts of our sociocultural reality,
such as nations, marriages, and laws: their very coming into existence
depends on intentional acts of (allegedly) rational agents. They have all,
so to speak, been “manufactured” by the creative intentions of rational
beings, and that is why they are called “artifacts.”
According to Thomasson, the identity conditions of a fictional character, that is, the conditions that determine when a particular character
comes into existence, are specified by the practices of the actual “literary
world” in which use is made of the “empty” name that supposedly refers
to a fictional character. For example, the sentence ”Josef K. exists” is
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true in case the name “Josef K.” is used with the intention to refer to a
fictional character, and that intention is successfully expressed through
some means that is recognizable as a part of an established literary practice. This condition is satisfied whenever the intentions of the author
(or authors) of a work are in line with the beliefs and practices of those
who deal competently with literary works. In short, what it takes to be a
fictional character is determined by the practices of literary critics and
authors. Given that the agent using a fictional name in creating a work
of literature is ipso facto an author, he or she can be regarded as one
of those individuals who regulate the existence conditions of fictional
characters. Thomasson dubs this the “easy approach to ontology.” As
long as the conditions of applicability of a proper name are satisfied,
the name refers and the referent thus exists.
One aspect of Thomasson’s sophisticated and well-developed theory
is the thesis that fictional characters are rigidly historically dependent
on the intentional acts of their creator(s). This means that in order to
come into existence, a fictional character requires a specific act of creation. In other words, being created at a specific moment by a specific
author is an essential feature of the character.15 A fictional character is
also constantly and generically dependent on the existence of the literary
work and of a community able to process information about it. These
conditions provide criteria for establishing when a character ceases to
exist: Lord Jim is a contingent being like us. Should all of the instances
of the text of Joseph Conrad’s novel be destroyed and should there no
longer be any agents capable of remembering or understanding the
text, Lord Jim would no longer exist.
Thomasson’s proposals are well worked out and carefully argued. They
represent, in our view at least, a significant advance in relation to the idea
that one can simply pull a world or a set of worlds out of a given work
of fiction, and in so doing, come up with a cast of fictional characters.
Yet there are some objections that can be raised to Thomasson’s views,
and we will briefly set forth two kinds of objections in what follows.
One kind of objection to this proposal targets the postulated link between metaphysical theses (in the sense of basic claims about the nature
and ontological status of various entities) and the “world” of literary
practices. Thomasson allows that with regard to many questions about
the individuation of characters, literary practice is vague and indecisive,
but her contention is that with regard to many other questions, literary
practice is stable and coherent.16 Our objection to this approach can be
couched in both a bold and more cautious form. The bold version denies
that the literary practices to which the philosopher defers in fact form
such a system. As is to be expected in a domain where experimentation
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and innovation are endemic, there is no stable consensus amongst the
(competent) practitioners, whose heterogeneous activities and attitudes
involve different and even contradictory standards.17 In a more cautious
version, the objection runs as follows: while it could be the case that
there is a subtending and stable system of competent practices constitutive of meaning and reference in literary fictions, the onus is on the
philosopher to establish that this is indeed the case, and to explain why
this should be so. Thomasson has not in fact shouldered this burden.
This does not entail, however, that it cannot be done, and indeed, it
is only an extreme species of skepticism that denies that many of the
statements made about literary characters have cogent and justifiable
answers. Yet even if there is demonstrable convergence on certain types
of claims amongst reasonable, well-informed readers, the question of
what makes this convergence competent, reasonable, and justifiable remains. More succinctly, the objection challenges the apparent assumption
that a subset of the critical discourse about literature is self-grounding
or in some obvious way warranted, and thus capable of providing an
uncontroversial ground for metaphysical contentions about the nature
and modes of existence of some category of entities.
A second objection to Thomasson’s view targets the fact that on her
account, a character is an abstract artifact. The complaint is that abstract
artifact theories cannot always provide a straightforward account of our
statements about fiction. Even though we may be inclined to accept
some arguments to the effect that our talk about fictional characters may
involve reference to (or quantification over) abstracta, this does not imply
that all our thoughts and statements involving fictional characters can
be analyzed straightforwardly in this way. In particular, an attribution
of a property to a fictional individual cannot always be analyzed as a
straightforward attribution of a property to an abstract object. Such an
analysis yields silly metaphysical mistakes. For example, in a translation
of Albert Camus’s L’étranger we find the following sentences: “His name
is Raymond Sintès. He’s a little on the short side, with broad shoulders
and a nose like a boxer’s.”18 What can be ruled out is that Camus and his
readers are in the business of attributing the property of having broad
shoulders to an abstract object, as abstract objects do not have shoulders
(or bones, or blood, and, in general, are not composed of cells). It follows
that claims within the context of a fiction cannot always be analyzed as
straightforward attributions of a property to an abstract object.
Thomasson has proposed at least one way of dealing with this issue.19
Namely, she would have us introduce a fictional operator (such as “in
the fiction . . .”) to disambiguate the attribution of properties to the
abstract object when it is taken as representing a fictional character in-
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side the context of the novel. This would help to mark off the specific
part of our fictional discourse that requires abstract artifacts, such as
metafictive ascriptions made by literary critics, or statements in which
readers implicitly quantify over characters in their debates. This strikes
us as an intuitively appealing move, but it is worth pointing out that it is
not entirely unproblematic and raises a number of interesting questions.
It is, moreover, a move characteristic of a rather different approach to
fiction, namely, the prefix strategy, which is a topic to which we return
in our next section.

Irrealism, Pretense, and Presupposition
The term “irrealist” can be used to single out a family of positions
that converge on the thought that it is a mistake to postulate certain
kinds of entities as the truth-makers for fictional discourse. There are
several logically distinct reasons why one might be inclined to distrust
such postulations. One is that there are strong, independent doubts
about the existence of these sorts of entities (such as nominalist worries
about abstract objects, or roughly, the idea that while there are particular
thoughts and drawings of triangles, there is no independently existing
abstract object to be referred to as “triangle”). Another kind of worry
is that reference to these entities cannot really suffice to sort out our
various statements about fiction, starting with “Sherlock Holmes does
not exist,” and moving on to “Arthur Conan Doyle had Holmes die in
‘The Final Problem’ but brought the character back to life years later
in ‘The Adventure of the Empty House.’”
One broad family of irrealist views is known as pretense theory. An
influential example is Kendall L. Walton’s proposal that metaphysically
dubious statements about fictional characters can be replaced by unobjectionable claims about imagining or pretense. Walton’s basic idea
is that works in the representational arts are to be understood in terms
of props for games of make-believe. Children’s imaginative use of toys
and objects in their games of make-believe are taken as the model for
understanding the proper relation between works of fiction and those
who engage with them. The function of the text of a novel, for example,
is to regulate and direct the imaginative games of the audience. Such
“props” in games of make-believe generate fictional truths and authorize
or prescribe certain imaginings. A fictional truth is something true in
such a game, where what this really means is that some kind of norm or
prescription warrants that such-and-such is to be imagined in that game.
As Walton puts it, “A proposition is fictional if it is to be imagined, if a
story or other work of fiction prescribes imagining it.”20
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While Walton claims that a philosophical analysis of the specificity
of propositional imagining would be desirable, he concedes that such
an analysis is out of reach. Very roughly, the core intuition is that to
imagine some object or state of affairs is to engage in a kind of nonassertive entertaining or considering based upon some prop, where such
an attitude does not entail holding that thought to be true.21 There is, of
course, much more to be said about the nature of imagining and how it
is in various ways different from, yet related to, such mental operations
as believing, conjecturing, and so on, but we will follow Walton in what
follows in working with a fairly sketchy idea of imagining as nonassertive
considering or entertaining in thought.
With regard to the philosophical puzzle concerning the truth conditions of earnest statements referring to fictional characters, Walton holds
that no such entity as Sherlock Holmes is required for statements about
the character in “The Final Solution” to be true. The use of the name
”Sherlock Holmes” is to be understood as taking place inside pretense:
the implicit writer or speaker of the sentences in the novel is pretending
to refer to an entity and thus is not committed to its actual existence.
Walton’s general scheme for dealing with fictional characters is that an
assertion concerning fictional entities is true in case it is fictional, in
the relevant authorized game of make-believe, that the agent making
that assertion speaks truly. An apparent assertion about a fictional entity
should be understood, then, as a move in a game of make-believe in
which we pretend to give a true description of the world.
Walton’s influential proposal rightly underscores the role of the imagination in the making and appreciation of works of fiction. If there are
any significant theses that form the object of a strong consensus in this
area of philosophy, one of them is that the attitude of imagining is essential to the difference between works of fiction and other categories of
works and utterances.22 It does not automatically follow from this point,
however, that a pretense account can deal with claims about fictional
characters that are made outside the pretense, such as “Sherlock Holmes is a fictional character.” This is a statement that many of us would
acknowledge as being straightforwardly true, and not true on the condition that we engage in some complicated rewording. Walton’s proposal,
for example, is to say, with regard to such statements, that in making
them we “acknowledge, while betraying the pretense, only that there is
a work in whose authorized games so pretending is fictionally to refer
successfully.”23 The relevant objection to this complicated rewording, as
voiced by Peter Lamarque, is that Walton’s theory “extends pretence too
widely” because it implies the presence of games of make-believe in cases
where a literal interpretation “seems more intuitive.”24 More bluntly put,
we don’t pretend that Conan Doyle invented a character named Sherlock
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Holmes, we rightly believe that he did so, and the reason why such beliefs
are true is that he really did create the character: the truth-maker is the
events involved in Doyle’s creative activity.
Is it really true that Walton’s sophisticated approach cannot successfully account for the truth conditions of straightforward and uncontroversial metafictional statements? To get a better sense of the problem,
note that if we mechanically apply the prefix strategy (appending the
“it is fictional that . . .” clause before the relevant statements about the
fictional characters), what we have previously identified as an intuitively
true metafictional statement becomes: “It is fictional in Conan Doyle’s
‘The Final Solution’ that Sherlock Holmes is a fictional character.”
This statement, however, reports an inference that the reader is in fact
not prescribed to draw within the pretense. What the fictioneer invites
us to imagine is that Holmes is a remarkably clever human being, not
a fictional character. There are, of course, self-reflexive fictions that
invite us to think of a fictional character as a fictional character, but an
adequate theory must handle fictions where this is not the case as well
as those where it is.25
It should be apparent at this point in the discussion that each of the
approaches surveyed so far is appealing in that it gets part of the story
right, but that each of them runs into trouble when faced with other
aspects of discourse about fictional characters. Is there no way to provide
a more comprehensive account?
One such approach to the logic and semantics of fictional characters
is Mark Sainsbury’s recent pluralistic proposal. As Sainsbury’s views on
the matter are quite complex, we can only offer a brief and simplified
sketch. Sainsbury argues that the supposed benefits of including exotic
entities such as unreal persons within our ontology can be had without
sacrificing a more sober and defensible ontology. He acknowledges that
discourse about fiction is varied, and proposes that different strategies
should be employed to deal with the different kinds of claims made
about fiction. A cornerstone of Sainsbury’s strategy is a theory about
fictional names called “Reference without Referents.”26 The basic idea
is that empty names can make a semantic contribution to the propositions of which they are a part, despite the fact that they lack a referent.
Unlike those who defend a standard referentialist account, Sainsbury
claims that in general we associate referring expressions with certain reference conditions, rather than with the referent of the expression itself.
For example, in the case of the name “Obama,” we have the following
conditions: for all x (“Obama” refers to x if and only if x = Obama).27
How does such an analysis help us with a simple sentence such as
“Josef K. is a bank clerk”? Sainsbury identifies various options. The
first option is to paraphrase the sentence in some way that makes it
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turn out true and not problematic, that is, not committing us to the
existence of exotic entities. The general idea behind this strategy is to
claim that a problematic sentence is true but, despite its apparent ontological commitment, its truth conditions are equivalent to those of a
nonproblematic sentence. For example, we can say that a sentence such
as “Josef K. is a bank clerk” is true and that, despite its apparent commitment to an exotic entity (Josef K.), this sentence can be paraphrased
into another one, the truth conditions of which are not ontologically
committing. The rationale behind this move is usually that the second
(and unproblematic) sentence reveals the real hidden logical form of
the previous one. For example, it is argued that the sentence “Josef K.
is a bank clerk” includes, at a logical level, a noncommitting fictional
operator: “According to the fiction, Josef K. is a bank clerk.” The two
sentences are equivalent because the latter is taken to reveal the real
logical form of the former.
A second option is to deny that this sentence is true, while adding
that, although the sentence is literally false because there is no actual
Josef K., we can still account for the idea that in some circumstances
the sentence can be taken as true. The trick is to have recourse to the
notion of presupposition. For example, we can say that when we take
the sentence to be true, we should be understood as presupposing that
the sentence is prefixed by an operator such as “according to Franz
Kafka’s The Trial.” Or perhaps the presupposition is that Josef K. is a
real person. Having recourse to the presupposition strategy allows us
to remain neutral about the equivalence in truth conditions between
the two sentences. Sainsbury notes that in conversational contexts our
presuppositions do not always match what we actually believe. In the
context of literary criticism, critics who discuss Josef K. can accept or
presuppose that Josef K. is a real person, without, however, believing
this to be true. They can do so for any number of reasons, such as attempting to arrive at a better understanding of the character’s possible
emotional states.28 Another strategy for dealing with claims about fiction
is to treat them not as truth-evaluable; in the place of truth values or
truth conditions, we adopt the notion of faithful-to-the-story.” Josef K. is
a bank clerk” would turn out to be faithful to the story, but not literally
true. What is and is not faithful to the story associated with a given work
of fiction is, of course, a matter of great controversy, one that returns
us, once more, to the basic problem of how the content of a fiction is
determined.29 While there are certain advantages in adopting Sainsbury’s
pluralistic approach, simplicity is not one of them.
To sum this last section up, the irrealist approach captures important,
well-entrenched ideas about the nature of fiction and fictional characters.
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Yet this kind of approach would appear to run aground on the historical
and cultural reality of created works and characters. This was the strength
of the abstract artifact theory that recognizes such items as irreducibly
real entities. Yet as we saw above, that very approach must at a certain
point have recourse to the prefix strategy and to some idea of a special
attitude, such as pretense or imagining, that governs certain statements
about fictional characters. Sainsbury’s pluralistic approach has the virtue
of inviting us to shift perspectives along with contexts so as to adopt viable ways of talking about the contrasting aspects of fictions, yet we are
left with the question of how these different perspectives and contexts
fit together, as well as the deeper problem of offering something like
a principled account of how the very content of a fiction, or in other
words, what happens in the story, is determined at all. With his evocation of “authorized games of make-believe,” Walton implies that there is
indeed a solution to that problem, but he in fact provides no principled
account of how the distinction between authorized and unauthorized
pretense is to be drawn and applied. The search for a comprehensive
account continues.

Fictional Characters as Nonexistent Objects
Not all philosophers have been convinced that the options are exhausted by a choice between believing and disbelieving in fictional
entities, or between postulating or denying their existence. An early
articulation of an alternative was Alexius Meinong’s contention that
fictional characters figure amongst those items in the universe that lack
the property of existence, but have a sort of being labelled Gegebenheit
or givenness (and not merely a givenness in thought or experience).30
According to this theory, when we say that Rebecca Sharp does not exist, we are right, but we can coherently add, without the “dodges” of
paraphrase, prefix, or presupposition, that she has musical talent and
manages to bring Lady Steyne to tears.
Meinongian theories of fictional entities, broadly conceived, include
a set of principles describing the nature of nonexistent objects.31 Purely
fictional characters are taken to be a subset of the set of nonexistent
objects. The main claim of Meinongians is that there are objects that do
not exist. If this formulation sounds contradictory (as the use of italics in
the last phrase was meant to suggest), it can be reformulated as “some
objects do not exist.” Meinong is followed in this regard by Terence
Parsons and Graham Priest, who argue that there is a viable distinction
between being and existence, and that it is not explicitly contradictory,
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even though it may sound paradoxical, to affirm that some of the objects
over which we quantify (by means of expressions of the form “for all,”
“there is,” and so on) do not have the property of existing.
The crucial thesis of Meinongian theories is that an object does not
have to exist in order to instantiate a property. This is a denial of what
has often been presented as a knock-down objection to the entire approach, namely, the thesis that existence is a necessary condition on
having properties.32 Finally, any theory of fictional entities that is to be
based on the idea of nonexistent objects must hold that the latter can
play the theoretical role that the former are supposed to play. Support
for this thesis is needed because even if the idea of nonexistent objects
can be defended successfully, it does not straightforwardly follow from
that idea that a subset of these nonexistent entities can be identified
with the set of fictional characters.
Meinongians motivate their approach by claiming that nonexistent
objects are necessary to the general explanation of various linguistic and
mental data. More specifically, Meinongian metaphysics is said to have
the advantage of providing an account of intentionality and intensionality.33 To begin with the latter, in one kind of statement about fictional
characters, intensional verbs are used to postulate a real relation between
an actual agent and a fictional character. An example is “René Girard
thinks Meursault is self-deceived.” According to Meinongians, nonexistent entities are crucial in accounts of such uses of intensional verbs
involving fictional characters, the thought being: no relation without
relata. But how does the Meinongian metaphysics help account for the
truth conditions of statements belonging to this category? According to
Priest, we can give an account of the truth of this statement by saying
that Girard thinks Meursault is self-deceived just in case Meursault, a
nonexistent object, is in those worlds that describe the sphere of what
Girard has beliefs about. The key idea here is that nonexistent entities
can be the referent of empty names and that as a result they can provide
an explanation of the meaningfulness and truth-value of expressions
containing this kind of names.
Turning now to intentionality, we begin with the thought that intentionality is, as Franz Brentano proposed, the “mark of the mental,” or
at least something essential to our mental states.34 According to many
philosophers, it is relatively uncontroversial to observe that people frequently think about things that cannot properly be described as being
part of the actual world (such as what Lord Byron and Percy Bysshe
Shelley would have done had they lived to a ripe old age), and the
proposed theoretical justification for believing in nonexistent objects
is that we can describe intentional mental states of this imaginative

philosophical perspectives on fictional characters

351

sort as being directed towards nonexistent objects. More bluntly put,
the Meinongian contention is that nonexistent objects play the role of
fictional intentional objects that do not belong to our world: when we
think about Rebecca Sharp, we have to be thinking about something,
and that something is a nonexistent person.
A question that comes to mind here is this: do Meinongians really explain the object-directedness of intentionality, or do they merely recruit a
pervasive assumption about this feature of our experience to ontological
ends? Perhaps the Meinongians have inverted the order of explanation:
what explains the illusory “being” of nonexistent objects is human intentionality, which allows us to engage in thoughts and imaginings about
what does not exist. Perhaps a genuine explanation of this capacity is
beyond the scope of philosophical analysis; in any case, the “account”
floated by Meinongians is hardly an explanation in any robust sense.
As could easily be expected, many philosophers have been quite perplexed by the idea that there are things that do not exist. It is regularly
complained that the distinction between being and existence is not
perspicuous, and that existence is not straightforwardly interpreted as
a property on a par with being red or being a bank clerk. Setting these
and other metaphysical and logical objections aside, for the purpose of
our discussion it is enough to show that there are problems with the
identification of a subset of nonexistent objects as the set of items that
play the role of fictional characters. One important desideratum for any
theory of fictional characters, we take it, is a convincing account of the
idea that a fictional characters bears a special relation to the author(s)
of the work in which that character figures.35 It seems reasonable to
suppose, for example, that before Fyodor Dostoyevsky thought and
wrote about Raskolnikov, there was no object to which the name “Raskolnikov” referred.
However, Meinongian theories of objects imply that there is an infinite
number of such objects even before any creative act was undertaken by
any author. Fictional characters, being a species of nonexistent objects,
are thus an arrangement of properties having a prior being (nonexistence); they are, then, arrangements that some author can select or pick
out, but not create. What is problematic about Meinongian doctrines
is that the internal structure of a fictional character remains the same
whatever the author does, his or her only role being to attribute to the
selected character the extranuclear property of being fictional or to appear in this or that novel. This is a very big problem for the doctrine if we
take seriously the idea that the creators of fictional works are genuinely
creative. While it would be a mistake to take this latter intuition to entail that authors bring real persons into existence ex nihilo, the account
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provided by Meinongians is nonetheless highly counterintuitive on this
point, at least for those who hold that authors do more than “select” a
character and “make it fictional.”36

Content and Character
The general arguments about the metaphysics and semantics of fiction
that we have passed in review leave various more specific questions in
the background, and it is to some of these that we turn in this section.
One such question is whether there is a distinction to be drawn between
fictional entities in general, such as all inanimate objects and settings,
and fictional characters more specifically. A house can, of course, in a
supernatural story be represented as having thoughts, feelings, and desires, and so function as a character in that fictional work. Yet in many
contexts, it makes good critical sense to distinguish between a novelist’s
description of a house and his or her descriptions of characters. Realists
about fictional entities could frame our question about the basis of such
a distinction as a request to identify those properties shared by all and
only fictional characters. For antirealists, the question can be framed as
follows: if a fictional character is anything at all, it is part of the contents
of a work of fiction, or what the fiction is about. One may then ask just
which parts those might be.
Philosophers debating the metaphysics of fiction have often had little
or nothing to say on this topic. Some have defended a broad conception
whereby the label “fictional characters” covers all objects, things, and
events as well as persons.37 The distinction alluded to above between
inanimate objects and characters would be groundless and of no critical use. A position of this sort has the advantage of not including any
potentially controversial theses about the nature of agents or persons,
but this is an advantage purchased at some cost. Such a conception has
the shortcoming, for example, of implying that certain ongoing debates
in literary studies are entirely misconceived—such as the debate over
the relative importance of character analysis in literary criticism, which
pertains to distinctions that these philosophers deem irrelevant or not
worth drawing in the first place.38 It also entails that the number of
characters in even the simplest fictions “explodes.” At the other extreme,
the term “character” is reserved for representations of persons, given
some more or less stringent conception of personhood (and some of the
philosophical conceptions are indeed so stringent that they would rule
that some of the human beings represented in fictions are not persons).39
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An alternative to these two approaches is to think of characters as
represented agents, where agents are beings capable of performing intentional actions.40 This minimalist proposal allows us to acknowledge that
some nonhuman entities in fiction are represented as having humanlike
qualities and can thus be conceived of as characters; it has the merit
of ruling out the nut Krakatuk in E. T. A. Hoffmann’s Nußknacker und
Mauseköning, while ruling in the intelligent and rebellious appliances in
Stanislaw Lem’s “Washing Machine Tragedy.”41 This proposal also has
the merit of neutrality with regard to ongoing disputes in psychology
and philosophy regarding the status of personality theory.42
Very briefly, the debate in question concerns the explanatory value of
attributing personality structures or character traits to individual human
beings. The personality theorist argues that it is cogent to explain a person’s dishonest actions, for example, by referring to a trait or disposition
that is a long-standing feature of that individual’s personality. This is, in
other words, the psychologist’s correlative to the moral philosopher’s
discourse of vices and virtues. The situationist, on the other hand, thinks
that the behavior in question could be better explained by referring
to those aspects of the situation that somehow prompted or elicited a
dishonest action. Situationists and other social psychologists speak of an
“attribution error” whereby people explain their own actions in terms
of flexible responses to contexts and situations, while trying to explain
the deeds of others by attributing to them (and herein lies the error)
long-standing dispositions or character traits. Armed with this result,
situationists complain that many works of fiction perpetuate the kind
of erroneous thinking that is characteristic of personality theory: the
novelist shows us a character who is explicable uniquely in terms of a
“ruling passion” or some such, and we are invited to extend this kind of
thinking to human beings in the real world. Yet the personality theorist
and the virtue ethicist respond to this entire line of reasoning by saying
that the ancient way of talking about character and action is not, in fact,
erroneous, and that moral character, both within and without fiction, is
at once real and of explanatory and moral import.
We cannot pursue the debate between these contrasting views in this
context. Instead, we want to point out that, even if it were established
that the explanatory value of character traits has been vastly overrated by
personality theorists and the discourse of moral psychology more generally, as situationists have argued, this finding would remain orthogonal
to the question of how agency has been represented in fictions, unless
one is in a hurry to assign cognitive value (or the lack thereof) to fictional
characterizations. Consider, for example, a possible situationist’s contention that Thackeray’s characterization of Rebecca Sharp is somehow
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faulty because her multiple deceptions and misdeeds are not sufficiently
linked to the influence of her situation. This could be right, but it does
not follow that the literary work is bad as a result. While works of fiction
can be mined for their psychological insights, this sort of cognitive payoff
is but one of the values of literature, and a work lacking such insights
may have other qualities worthy of our attention.
Another question that has been explored by philosophers as well
as literary critics is whether every narrative work of fiction has at least
one narrator.43 In cases where there is a narrator, it can also be asked
whether this figure should be counted amongst the characters in the
fiction. There are reasons why one might think so, at least if we assume
that characters are part of the fiction’s content—the part in which
agents and their doings are represented. One such doing is telling or
recounting, and any figure represented as doing such things qualifies
as a character in the story. Some such content is explicit, as in the many
long embedded narratives in Charles Sorel’s Histoire comique de Francion.
Yet the characterization of the storyteller is sometimes largely or entirely
implicit. As a storyteller’s voice or writerly style always represents aspects
of his or her agency (for example, in the manner of choosing phrases
and points of view), we may conclude that all narrators are characters.
(Although we do not have space to pursue the topic here, an analogous
reasoning extends to implicit readers or auditors, as when Marcel Proust’s
narrator anticipates and responds to an objection that Monsieur le lecteur
addresses to Monsieur l’auteur.44)
It does not follow from this argument that the characterization of the
narrator is necessarily coherent or plausible. Consider the narrator of
Vanity Fair, whose statements and quotations tend to convey a seemingly
authorial perspective on the various agents’ antics. One is not inclined
to think of this narrator as one of the characters until reading a passage in chapter 62, where the narrator tells us: “It was on this very tour
that I, the present writer of a history of which every word is true, had
the pleasure to see them first, and to make their acquaintance.” If the
narrator is a person in the story, that is, someone capable of meeting
and talking to Becky and the others, then how could this same narrator
be omniscient, or in a position to know that every word about Becky’s
private thoughts is true? One conclusion that could be drawn is that it
is true in Thackeray’s fiction that his narrator is an impossible agent, a
bit like a time traveler who visits his hometown prior to his own birth
and prevents his mother from giving birth to him.
Another question about the basic constitution of the cast of characters
is raised by the fictioneer’s actual or apparent reference to real persons.
Is it appropriate to apply the designation “fictional characters” to such
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figures? For example, in Alexandre Dumas’s play of 1853, La jeunesse de
Louis XIV, Molière serves as the young Louis’s secret agent in a variety
of courtly intrigues involving Mazarin and his niece. It is tempting to
argue that either Dumas’s play is a work of fiction having no fictional
characters, or that it is a work of fiction, the primary characters of which
are all historical figures familiar to the author and his initial audience.
While some members of that audience may have had no firm opinions
regarding Molière and his relations with Louis XIV, those who were
somewhat well-informed about seventeenth-century France and the life
of Jean-Baptiste Poquelin, whose nom de plume was Molière, would probably have doubted, and with good reason, that the ambitious dramatist
was involved in any of the intrigues that make up the action of the play.
Such beliefs, however, presumably did not prevent them from engaging
imaginatively with the contents of the fiction. In fact, with regard to this
and many kindred examples, the prescribed imaginative attitude involves
comparisons between the content of one’s relevant beliefs (about historical figures as well as characters in earlier works) and the contents one is
being invited to imagine. Some of what is believed or known about the
historical figure carries over into one’s understanding of the fictional
character bearing the same name, but other such beliefs do not.
Similarly, in appreciating a cinematic adaptation of a well-known literary work, one actively compares the work’s Rebecca Sharp character to
the characterization bearing that name in the source work, sometimes
decrying, sometimes rejoicing in, the differences and similarities. This is
part of what it means to appreciate the adaptation as an adaptation, so
that one’s appreciative experience of the works is a complicated blend
of imaginative engagement and metafictional reflection.

Conclusion
In the place of a recapitulation of points from our descriptive survey,
we propose the following concise formulation of our own understanding
of the key problems and of our preferred approach to their solution.
We deny, contra the Meinongian line, that fictional entities are best
thought of as nonexistents that have some special mode of being called
“subsistence.” Although such postulations would certainly provide the
sought-after truth-makers for fictional discourse, they themselves would
appear to stand in need of plausible truth-makers. For similar reasons,
we do not find it promising to try to explain the referential function of
fictional discourse in terms of worlds furnished by either concrete or
abstract possible entities, at least if talk of fictional worlds is supposed
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to be more than loose and metaphorical. More generally, in this regard
we follow Roman Ingarden and Amie Thomasson in espousing the assumption that the grounds of fictional discourse are quite complex.
A first such basis is the creative human capacity known traditionally as
the imagination. Irrealists are right to identify imagining as the distinctive type of mental attitude and process that opens the door to fiction,
just as the artifact theorist is right to think of works of fiction and their
contents as the result of human creativity. To create a work of fiction is
to engage in a specific train of imaginings and subsequently to create a
prop of some kind, such as a text or an audiovisual display, that can serve
to invite others to engage in similar imaginative experiences. A good
philosophical account of how a work of fiction can be created begins
with the assumption that human beings have the capacity to engage
in imaginings having determinate content, but it does not follow that
philosophy can or need provide any deeper explanation of how this is
possible. Works of fiction are created only if agents use their imaginations in certain kinds of ways and end up endowing the work with a
determinate content, where the term “content” refers to what is to be
imagined in engaging appreciatively with the work qua work of fiction.
The determinate content of a work of fiction owes its existence, then, to
the imaginative process or act, and this is what grounds the truth-values
of such statements as Rebecca Sharp is a fictional character, while also
justifying the seemingly contrasting contentions that Rebecca Sharp
does not exist, and that she has a lot of musical talent. While the act of
imagining a particular train of thoughts is real, what those thoughts are
about can, but need not, be anything actual or possible.
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